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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
In the light of the variant moral and social standards which are current,
there seems to be little uniformity in the interpretation of what is or is not
a petty offense, thus leaving the courts much leeway to decide individual
cases according to judicial prejudices and standards. See further, Frank-
furter and Corcoran, above, n. 278, appendixes A, B, C, D. H. R. S., '32.
CRIMINAL LAW-CONSPIRACY-CONVICTION OF ONE DEFENDANT.-our
persons were charged with conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition
Act by the illicit manufacture of intoxicating liquor. Conviction of de-
fendant was upheld, notwithstanding two were acquitted and one had not
been apprehended. Rosenthal v. United States (1930) 45 F. (2d) 1000.
The general rule is that only one of several defendants cannot be con-
victed of conspiracy. People v. Hamilton (1915) 165 App. Div. 546, 151 N.
Y. S. 125; Sherman v. State (1925) 113 Neb. 173, 202 N. W. 413; Bartkhus
v. U. S. (1927) 21 F. (2d) 425. Where the conviction as to one of two de-
fendants was reversed, it was held to carry with it a reversal as to the
other, Morrow v. U. S. (1926) 11 F. (2d) 256; Turinetti v. U. S. (1924) 2 F.
(2d) 15, and reversal of conviction as to three of four defendants proceeded
against as conspirators required the same ruling as to the fourth. Cofer v.
U. S. (1930) 37 F. (2d) 677.
But where a defendant is charged with conspiring with persons unknown,
a different rule governs. As held in U. S. v. Hamilton (1876) F. Cas. No.
15, 288, if the jury find from the evidence that one of the defendants has
conspired, not with his co-defendant, but with other unknown persons a
verdict of guilty could be had as to him, accompanied by one of not guilty
as to his co-defendant. Where two defendants were charged with having
unlawfully conspired together and with other persons unknown to the grand
jury, to violate the National Prohibition Act, held, the acquittal as to one
did not require the acquittal of both. Donegan v. U. S. (1922) 287 F. 641.
Where three persons were engaged in a conspiracy and one of them died
before trial and another was acquitted, it was held that the survivor might
be tried and convicted. People v. Olcott, 2 Johns. Cas. 301. Where one of
four conspirators was not indicted, in order to obtain his evidence for the
prosecution, and the indictment of two other conspirators was dismissed on
the motion of the prosecuting officer, leaving the question of guilt or inno-
cence undetermined, these conspirators were held not to have been acquit-
ted or discharged under such circumstances that the remaining conspirator
might not be indicted and sentenced. Bradshaw v. Territory (1887) 3 Wash.
Terr. 265, 14 Pac. 594.
Thus one defendant may be convicted of the offense of conspiracy pro-
vided the acquittal of co-conspirators does not remove the basis of the
charge. Browne v. U. S. (1905) 145 F. 1; People v. Richards (1885) 67
Cal. 412, 7 Pac. 828. It is only when all of the co-conspirators have either
been acquitted, or discharged. under circumstances tantamount to acquittal
that a conspirator cannot be convicted. Bradshaw v. Territory, above.
H. H. G., '33.
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